Is a slip-and-fall plaintiff’s allegation that a floor was “shiny” sufficient to raise a jury issue as to whether it was safe to walk on? The Rhode Island Supreme Court faced that question last week.

Click here to read the full article at lawyersusaonline.com.

A federal judge on Monday gave the go ahead to a product liability lawsuit filed by a California woman who claimed she suffered injuries from a mass of toxic mold growing in her Sleep Number mattress.

Click here to read the full article at lawyersusaonline.com.

A military power of attorney is a critical document for managing affairs on the home front when a spouse is deployed overseas. A Kentucky military family had to learn the hard way that only having a photocopy of that document can stop a real estate transaction dead in its tracks.

Click here to read the full article at lawyersusaonline.com.

Everyone’s hometown seems to have that one particular stretch of highway that is notorious for automobile accidents. One inspired St. Louis attorney has attempted to make a class action out of a strip of interstate that seemingly has more than its fair share of wet-pavement crashes.

The attorney is William K. Holland. The troublesome roadway is a 1.3-mile section of Interstate 44 in Phelps County, Missouri. Holland represents two plaintiffs who were injured in wet-pavement crashes on that stretch of highway.

On Oct. 17, 2006, Sherry Smith’s pick-up truck spun out of control when it hit a wet patch on I-44. Smith’s pick-up left the roadway and collided with another vehicle that was passing on an outer road.

On July 14, 2009, Donna Triplett was a passenger in a vehicle that had the misfortune of encountering the I-44 section on a rainy day. The driver lost control and his car left the road, striking the median barrier.

Holland did some digging and discovered that his clients weren’t the only ones to be involved in similar crashes between 2006 and 2010. State highway patrol records indicate that one driver lost control of his car on wet pavement and struck a semi. In another accident, a driver lost control when he tapped his brakes to avoid a semi that was making a lane change.

What’s the cause of all these mishaps? Holland’s theory is that the pavement surface on this particular portion of I-44 section lacks proper skid resistance, perhaps because it hasn’t been repaved since 2003. There’s also a question as to whether the state department of transportation relocated a 60 mph speed limit sign in the area to account for the allegedly unsafe conditions.

When his clients sued the Missouri Highways and Transportation Commission for negligence, Holland tried to turn their lawsuits into a class action. Holland’s proposed class included all those who suffered damages “arising from wet pavement, loss-of-control accidents” on the I-44 section between 2006 and 2010. According to state highway patrol records, there may be over 100 crashes falling within the class definition.

Holland won the first round on class certification. On Dec. 10, 2010, Phelps County Circuit Judge Mary W. Sheffield   concluded that “[c]ommon questions of fact exist as to whether the pavement surface lacked proper skid resistance and was in a dangerous condition at the time of the Smith and Triplett crashes, and whether their injuries directly resulted from that condition.”

Accordingly, the judge certified a class composed of “all persons who have sustained injuries or damages as a result of wet pavement crashes on a 1.3 mile section of eastbound I-44, Phelps County, beginning at or about the relocated 60 mph speed limit sign near the west city limits of Rolla and ending at or about 100 feet past the west junction of Business Loop 44, within five years preceding the date of this order.”

While Holland had won the first round, the Missouri Court of Appeals would have its chance to weigh in.

Alas, at the end of last month, the appellate court was convinced by the state department of transportation that the class had been improperly certified.

In reversing the class certification order, the court said that “there are too many variables from accident to accident, and individual evidence would have to be presented regarding causation for almost every case.”

The appeals court explained that the “exhibits offered by Smith and Triplett show that all but four of the accidents had some other contributing circumstance. The most common contributing circumstance involved the speed of one of the vehicles involved: over 100 incidents involved a vehicle traveling too fast for the conditions, and 19 incidents involved a vehicle exceeding the speed limit. The determination of whether the speed was too fast for the conditions depends on much more than the condition of the roadway and will be specific to each accident.”

The court also noted that, in 17 of the reported incidents, other actions on the part of the driver contributed to the accident. Two of those “other actions” involved drug use.

“These numbers show that in many, if not most of the accidents, causation will be substantially determined on the basis of these other contributing circumstances,” the court said. “These individual issues of causation would overwhelm the common issue of whether the road was in a defective condition and whether that condition was a cause of the accident. Consequently, the predominance requirement was not met because a class action proceeding is not apt to generate common answers that are apt to drive the resolution of the proceeding.” (Smith v. Missouri Highways and Transportation Commission)

So for the time being Holland’s novel class action is no more. It will be interesting to see if his case finds a sympathetic ear in the Missouri Supreme Court.

– Pat Murphy

patrick.murphy@lawyersusaonline.com

Usually, lawyers make money when a divorce case degenerates into all-out warfare between the parties. But one New Jersey law firm has been left with $122,000 in unpaid fees after a judge was forced to step in to protect the children in a bitter divorce.

The firm, Budd Larner, P.C., became entangled in the divorce of Frank and Edie Sauro in September 2006. That was the midpoint of the protracted case. Edie had filed for divorce in New Jersey state court three years earlier. It would be another three years before a final judgment of divorce would be entered.

Budd Larner was the second of the three firms that would represent Edie in the case. Edie had already filed for bankruptcy, so Budd Larner’s prospects for payment hinged on the division of marital property. Frank Sauro was a partner in a real estate development business. He received a $500,000 distribution from the partnership, and the trial court ordered these funds placed in escrow as the prime marital asset.

However, those funds were rapidly being dissipated in the divorce litigation. And provisions would have to be made for the care of Frank and Edie’s three kids, no matter what the outcome.

Budd Larner withdrew from the case in July 2008. The trial court imposed an attorney charging lien in favor of the firm, to be attached to Edie’s equitable distribution award. Edie owed Budd Larner more than $162,000 in fees by this time, so the firm had a keen interest in the outcome of the case.

When the trial court entered its final judgment of divorce in January 2010, only $324,812.99 remained in escrow from Frank’s real estate partnership. From these funds, the court ordered that $48,449.80 be designated as an equitable distribution to Edie. The court directed that Budd Larner be paid 81.82 percent, or $39,641.63, from Edie’s equitable distribution award of $48,449.80. Budd Larner retained a lien against Edie for $122,664.97.

What about the rest of the $324,812.99 in escrow? Well, since the Sauros had been in a veritable knife fight for years and couldn’t agree on anything, the trial court decided that it was high time for someone to look out for the interests of the parties’ three children. The court ordered that $200,000 from escrow be placed in a college trust account for the benefit of the Sauro kids.

Of course, this seriously impaired Budd Larner’s attorney lien against Edie for $122,664.97.

Budd Larner appealed, arguing that state law prohibited the trial court from allocating marital assets in a manner that prejudiced its statutory attorney lien.

But the New Jersey Appellate Division decided yesterday that the trial court acted within its authority.

“We conclude that the trial judge’s decision to establish an education trust fund to cover the children’s cost of attending college was properly supported by the record, well within the court’s authority, and in keeping with the court’s obligation to act in the best interest of the children,” the court said.

It explained that “Budd Larner’s contractual rights, as reflected in the retainer agreement with [Edie], do not abrogate or limit the [trial court's] overriding obligation to act in the best interest of the children in this case.”

The court observed that the extraordinary remedy was fully justified by the protracted litigation in the case, which saw the dissipation of the parties’ financial resources as they fought tooth and nail over virtually every key pretrial order:

When the adults in the controversy are unable or unwilling to act in the best interests of their own children, the court must be free to act, swiftly, decisively, and unfettered by extraneous considerations. The establishment of a judicially crafted educational trust fund is but one of a myriad of creative remedies in the court’s equitable arsenal. An attorney charging lien, or any other of the possible numerous claims that can be asserted against a family’s limited financial resources, cannot undermine the court’s parens patriae responsibility.

(Sauro v. Sauro)

– Pat Murphy

patrick.murphy@lawyersusaonline.com

Federal employment discrimination law can’t be stretched to right every wrong. That’s the upshot of a federal judge’s decision to dismiss a Title VII lawsuit filed by a postal worker upset by a “When All Else Fails, Blame the White Male” bumper sticker.

Alfreda Lockwood first saw the bumper sticker when she reported for work at the U.S. Post Office in Anchorage, Alaska one day in 2009. David Champion, a white custodian, had allegedly placed the bumper sticker on a trashcan in the workplace.

Lockwood is an African-American female. On July 31, 2009, Lockwood complained to her manager, Kris Lyons. Lyons spoke with Champion about the sticker and had it removed.

That should have been the end of the matter, but on Aug. 11, 2009, Lockwood discovered another “When All Else Fails, Blame the White Male” sticker on the bumper of her car. An indignant Lockwood reported the matter to the police and her post office bosses. Although Champion was the prime suspect, an investigation failed to conclusively establish that the custodian was responsible for placing the bumper sticker on Lockwood’s automobile.

Lockwood alleges that she was harassed by Champion in other ways, too. Lockwood reported several incidents between August and September 2009. On one occasion, Champion allegedly shouted at her about having been reported to management about the bumper sticker on the trash can. The custodian also allegedly interrupted Lockwood’s conversations with another postal employee by banging his fists on a table. Upsetting Lockwood further, Champion allegedly took to yelling “boo” whenever she was around.

To handle the problem, post office management tried to juggle the two employees’ break schedules to keep them separated, but that wasn’t enough for Lockwood.

After the EEOC reviewed Lockwood’s complaints and decided not to pursue them, Lockwood sued in federal court. Her Title VII complaint against the U.S. Postal Service included claims for race and sex discrimination, as well as a claim for hostile work environment. In addition, Lockwood also sued the postal service for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Lockwood’s lawsuit was dropped into the lap of U.S. District Judge Sharon L. Gleason, and the judge didn’t like what she saw. Earlier this month, the judge granted the post office’s motion for summary judgment.

On Lockwood’s clams for race and sex discrimination, the judge just didn’t see how Lockwood suffered an adverse employment action.

“Ms. Lockwood was not demoted, or reassigned to a new position with different responsibilities, or otherwise made to suffer a significant change in her employment status or benefits,” the judge explained.

Turning to Lockwood’s hostile environment claim, Judge Gleason found that most of the complained-of conduct, rather than based on Lockwood’s race or gender, was based on the mutual dislike between her and Champion.

While the judge acknowledged that the bumper sticker did implicate race and gender, she concluded that the sticker alone could not serve as the basis for a hostile environment claim:

The sticker’s message is more likely intended to be read as a sarcastic jab at modern trends of racial and gender sensitivity. Yet despite the racial, gendered nature of the bumper sticker’s message, this court finds that there is no evidence that Mr. Champion’s posting of the sticker on the trashcan at the workplace was specifically directed at Ms. Lockwood. Instead, it was placed at the workplace as a general commentary that was not directed at any one individual, gender, or race. As such, Mr. Champion’s conduct at the workplace with regard to the bumper sticker on the trashcan “fall[s] into the ‘simple teasing and offhand comments’ category of non-actionable discrimination.”

Similarly, the judge found that Lockwood’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim failed as a matter of law.

“While certainly it is highly inappropriate to place a bumper sticker on another person’s vehicle, and particularly a bumper sticker that one knows is offensive to the vehicle’s owner, such conduct cannot be regarded ‘as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community’ so as to state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress,” Gleason wrote. (Lockwood v. Donahoe)

– Pat Murphy

patrick.murphy@lawyersusaonline.com

There’s nothing like a dry insurance dispute to take all the fun out of a haunted house. Of course, Tyler Hodges’ experience at the Bricktown Haunted House in Oklahoma City wasn’t all that much fun to begin with.

Hodges was manning the ticket booth at the haunted house on the evening of Oct. 14, 2007, when he discovered that his flashlight wasn’t working.

Someone at the Bricktown Haunted House had come up with the bright idea of storing spare flashlights in the freight elevator of the building, so Hodges made his way through the dark to the elevator, lifted the wooden gate across the entrance and stepped in.

Unfortunately, because of the dark interior Hodges couldn’t see that the elevator was on the floor above and fell 20 feet down the empty shaft. Hodges sustained serious injuries in the fall and incurred medical expenses in excess of $110,000.

The good news for Hodges was that the Bricktown Haunted House was covered by not one but two liability insurance policies with limits of $2 million each.

Western World Insurance admitted coverage and took up the defense when Hodges sued the operator of the haunted house – Brewer Entertainment – in Oklahoma state court. The case was settled for an undisclosed amount and Western World turned to Brewer Entertainment’s other insurer, Markel American Insurance, to share the cost of the personal injury settlement.

Under Oklahoma’s doctrine of equitable contribution, when two or more insurers cover the same risk, each insurer must pay a share fair of the common obligation.

But Markel thought it had an escape clause and balked at covering Hodges’ personal injury claim against Brewer Entertainment from the outset. A clause added to the Markel policy by a later endorsement provided that “[t]his insurance shall not apply to any entity that is already an insured under any other insurance provided by any company.”

Markel relied on the “other insurance” endorsement when Western World demanded that Markel pay half the cost of Hodges’ personal injury settlement. The insurance dispute went to federal court and Markel won the first round, obtaining a summary judgment on the basis of the “other insurance” clause.

But yesterday the 10th Circuit decided that Markel’s contractual right to disavow coverage was not as clear as the insurance company needed it to be.

The 10th Circuit first decided that the “other insurance” endorsement, when read in context with other provisions of the policy, did not clearly preclude coverage of the claim at issue. In particular, the court noted that the “other insurance” endorsement seemed to be in clear conflict with language addressing other insurance in Section IV of Markel’s general commercial liability policy.

Markel tried to argue that the language in the endorsement replaced the language in the policy, but the 10th Circuit wasn’t convinced.

“If Markel’s endorsement clearly and totally supplanted the contract’s ‘Other Insurance’ provision, we would of course enforce it according to its terms,” the court said. “But the language of the escape clause gives no hint of such a design.”

Arriving at the conclusion that the insurance contract and its endorsement created an ambiguity, the 10th Circuit turned to Oklahoma’s default rule that policy language must be interpreted to meet the “reasonable expectations” of the insured.

It was here that Markel lost its fight to escape paying half of the Hodges personal injury settlement. The court explained:

Applying the reasonable expectations doctrine to this case, we have no doubt a reasonable insured in Brewer Entertainment’s shoes would have expected coverage from Markel. Expected coverage in light of Markel’s general policy language promising Brewer coverage for accidents just like this one. Expected coverage in light of Section IV’s promise that Markel will shoulder the burden of co-insurance. Expected coverage given the fact that the endorsement nowhere mentions Section IV and the escape clause is readily susceptible to a narrow reading. Neither are we directed to any counter-indication that Brewer understood (or should have understood) the escape clause as barring coverage here.

(Western World Insurance v. Markel American Insurance)

– Pat Murphy

patrick.murphy@lawyersusaonline.com

A Maine man claims that Gibson’s Apple Orchard is liable for his motorcycle crash because the farm’s roadside sign partially blocked the view of drivers at the intersection where his accident occurred. The state’s highest court decided last week that the motorcyclist just might have a case.

James M. McIlroy suffered serious injuries when he lost control of his motorcycle on Oct. 13, 2007. At the time, McIlroy was travelling westbound on U.S. Route 2, approaching the T-intersection where North Road enters the highway in Bethel, Maine.

McIlroy had the right of way and claims that he lost control of his motorcycle trying to avoid a car trying to make a right-hand turn from North Road. The car was driven by a former defendant in the case, Charlotte Small.

Gibson’s Apple Orchard had placed an eight-foot-square temporary wooden sandwich-style sign near the intersection for the apple-picking season. Although the exact location of the sign cannot be conclusively established, the parties agree that at some point it obstructed the view drivers on North Road had of westbound Route 2 traffic.

The two people involved in the accident have separate theories on how the accident occurred, both of which implicate the Gibson’s sign. According to McIlroy, Small had pulled partially into the intersection in order to see what was coming down Route 2. McIlroy alleges that he needed to swerve to avoid Small’s car, causing him to lose control.

Small claims that she hadn’t actually entered the intersection, but had stopped at the very edge of North Road to get a look past the sign. Small’s theory is that McIlroy lost control because it appeared that she was about to pull into his path.

Under both theories, McIlroy blames Gibson’s for the placement of its sign. McIlroy sued Gibson’s for negligence, but the trial court granted the farm’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that no reasonable jury could find that the sign proximately caused the accident.

Last week, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court breathed new life into McIlroy’s lawsuit, concluding that a jury issue existed as to proximate causation:

Although there is no evidence of the exact location of the sign, that evidence would not be necessary for a rational jury to make a finding of causation. A jury could find that the sign was close to the intersection, based on Small’s testimony that she proceeded about four feet from her second stop, where the sign still obstructed her view, to her third and final stop before the intersection, where her view was unobstructed. If the jury found that the sign was close to the intersection, it could also find that Small either needed to advance some distance into the intersection to clear the sign, or she needed to stop and then advance again just short of entering the intersection in a way that made McIlroy believe she was headed into the intersection.

(McIlroy v. Gibson’s Apple Orchard)

– Pat Murphy

patrick.murphy@lawyersusaonline.com

A medical-malpractice plaintiff will get a new trial because a nurse who served as jury foreperson broke her pledge not to bring her professional experience to bear in deliberations.

“Counsel were entitled to rely on the foreperson’s guaranty to the trial court that she would not allow her professional expertise to override the testimony presented,” wrote Oklahoma Supreme Court Justice Joseph N. Watt in Ledbetter v. Howard.

The plaintiff in the case, Guy Ledbetter, is an Oklahoma City-area resident who has a long history of diabetes. He suffers from peripheral neuropathy of the legs and feet, a serious diabetic complication affecting the nerves of those appendages.

On May 31, 2005, Ledbetter went to his primary care physician complaining of swelling, redness, and discomfort in his left foot and leg. His doctor initially diagnosed Ledbetter with cellulitus, an infection of the soft tissues, and began treating him with oral antibiotics.

Ledbetter’s condition hadn’t improved by June 7th, so Ledbetter’s doctor had him hospitalized for intravenous antibiotics. While hospitalized, Ledbetter had x-rays taken of his left foot on June 9th to determine if he suffered from a bone infection.

These first  x-rays were read by Dr. Derek Howard of Radiology Services of Ardmore. Dr. Howard allegedly reported no dislocations or fractures and that Ledbetter’s foot was radiographically normal. Ledbetter was subsequently released from the hospital when his condition seemed to improve.

However, Ledbetter continued to experience swelling in his left foot and his family doctor ordered a second set of x-rays three weeks later. X-rays taken on July 5th showed a dramatic deterioration of the bones in Ledbetter’s left foot. Ledbetter’s doctor sent him to a foot specialist to be treated for Charcot Foot, a disease of the nerves which causes deterioration of the bone structure of the foot. To treat the Charcot Foot, Ledbetter needed reconstructive surgery and extensive rehabilitation.

Ledbetter sued Howard and Radiology Services for negligence, alleging that the doctor misread the June 9th x-ray, causing delayed treatment of his rapidly deteriorating left foot.

During voir dire, the woman who would eventually become jury foreperson testified that she was a licensed practical nurse who provided home-health care. The foreperson explained that, although she dealt with diabetics on a daily basis, she had never attended a patient with Charcot foot.

Naturally, the trial court was concerned the foreperson would introduce her professional experience into jury deliberations. But the foreperson was seated after she assured the court that she could be unbiased and that she would not substitute her experience as a nurse for the evidence introduced at trial.

When the jury returned a defense verdict, Ledbetter’s lawyers smelled a rat.

After doing some digging, they came up with evidence that the foreperson had broken her pledge to the court that she would not infect jury deliberations with her professional experience.

One of the foreperson’s fellow jurors signed a sworn affidavit recounting that the nurse had taken charge of deliberations “eagerly sharing her experiences and knowledge of the proper care and treatment of diabetic patients.” According to the juror, the foreperson had hypothesized that Ledbetter’s history of foot problems was probably due to his failure to take his insulin as instructed.

Moreover, the foreperson allegedly opined that, because Ledbetter had Charcot foot, he would “likely have had the same problems and result” regardless of any delay in treatment caused by Howard’s misreading of the original x-ray.

The juror’s affidavit was sufficient to convince the trial court to grant Ledbetter a new trial on the ground of juror misconduct, but a state appeals court ordered that the defense verdict in favor of Howard and Radiology Services be reinstated.

Last month, the Oklahoma Supreme Court rode to Ledbetter’s rescue, concluding that a new trial was in order.

Justice Watt in his majority opinion first addressed Howard’s threshold argument that, under state law, the juror affidavit was inadmissible to impeach the jury’s verdict. Watt concluded that the affidavit was admissible under the “extraneous prejudicial information” exception to Oklahoma law generally protecting the integrity of jury verdicts.

The justice explained that the foreperson’s statements as reported in the affidavit were “clearly improper” under the statutory exception because they were “statements of fact by the foreperson; involved purportedly extraneous information arising solely from the foreperson’s professional experience; and were intended to sway the jury toward a defendant’s verdict.”

Watt emphasized that the court’s decision in Ledbetter was not a broad pronouncement on when or how a professional may utilize individual training or expertise in the deliberative process. Nor did the case stand for the proposition that a prospective juror’s single false answer during voir dire justifies a new trial, the judge said.

Instead, Watt said that a new trial was in order in Ledbetter’s case because counsel were entitled to rely on the foreperson’s guarantee that she would not allow her professional expertise to override the evidence presented at trial.

“Here, the simple fact is that during voir dire, the foreperson clearly stated that she would not substitute her experiences as a nurse to diabetic patients to over-ride witness testimony,” Watt wrote. “The affidavit indicates she did exactly what she promised not to do once deliberations began and went even further by attempting to influence her fellow jurors based on her professional knowledge and experiences, all while acting in the leadership position of foreperson on the jury.”

– Pat Murphy

patrick.murphy@lawyersusaonline.com

In something of a head-scratcher, a federal judge in Virginia decided last week that clicking “like” on a Facebook page is not a form of expression that deserves the protection of the First Amendment.

The ruling came in the context of a retaliatory discharge case brought by six former employees of the sheriff’s office for the city of Hampton, Virginia. Two of the plaintiffs were civilian employees, four were uniformed deputy sheriffs. Each of the six plaintiffs lost their jobs after Sheriff B.J. Roberts won reelection in 2009.

Sheriff Roberts contends that the plaintiffs lost their jobs for unsatisfactory performance or as a result of a reduction in force occasioned by a sheriff’s department reorganization.

The plaintiffs claim that they really lost their jobs because Sheriff Roberts discovered that they had supported his opponent in the election, Jim Adams. So in March 2011, the plaintiffs sued Sheriff Roberts in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. They alleged that the sheriff violated their First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and freedom of association when he fired them.

The interesting Facebook issue in the case concerns one particular plaintiff, Daniel Ray Carter, who had been a uniformed deputy sheriff for the city of Hampton.

Carter claimed that he engaged in constitutionally protected speech when he “made statements” on Adams’ Facebook page. In reality, the only thing Carter actually did was click the “like” icon for the page, presumably indicating his favorable opinion of its content.

Evidently, Sheriff Roberts became aware of the activity on his opponent’s Facebook page and that’s what allegedly made Carter a marked man when it came time to settle scores following the election.

The sheriff argued that Carter didn’t have a First Amendment claim because Carter hadn’t engaged in protected speech.

Last week, U.S. District Judge Raymond A. Jackson dismissed Carter’s claim on summary judgment, agreeing that simply clicking “like” on Facebook doesn’t implicate the First Amendment.

“It is the Court’s conclusion that merely ‘liking’ a Facebook page is insufficient speech to merit constitutional protection,” the judge said. “In cases where courts have found that constitutional speech protections extended to Facebook posts, actual statements existed within the record.”

According to Judge Jackson, that was the basic problem with allowing Carter’s claim to proceed.

“No such statements exist in this case. Simply liking a Facebook page is insufficient. It is not the kind of substantive statement that has previously warranted constitutional protection. The Court will not attempt to infer the act content of Carter’s posts from one click of a button on Adams’ Facebook page,” the judge said. (Bland v. Roberts)

Judge Jackson’s decision has created something of a stir among those experts who keep a close eye on legal developments in the brave new world of social media.

One critic who believes the decision will be reversed by the 4th Circuit is Eugene Volokh, a law professor at the University of California at Los Angeles.

In a blog post, Volokh explained why a Facebook “like” deserves the protection of the First Amendment:

A Facebook “like” is a means of conveying a message of support for the thing you’re liking. That’s the whole point of the “like” button; that’s what people intend by clicking “like,” and that’s what viewers will perceive. Moreover, the allegation is that the employees were fired precisely because the Sheriff disapproved of the message the “like” conveyed. I would treat “liking” as verbal expression – though it takes just one mouse-click, it publishes to the world text that says that you like something. But even if it’s just treated as symbolic expression, it is still constitutionally protected. …

– Pat Murphy

patrick.murphy@lawyersusaonline.com