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    Employer not liable under ADA despite ‘100% healed’ policy

    Does an employer violate the Americans with Disabilities Act by firing an injured employee who can’t return to work under a “100% healed” policy?

    On Tuesday, the 10th Circuit answered that question in the negative in a “regarded as” disability case involving a miner who was unable to return to work without restrictions after being injured in an on-the-job accident.

     

    Jared Dillon worked as a maintenance mechanic for Mountain Coal Company at the West Elk Mine in Colorado. Dillon suffered permanent back and neck injuries when he was struck by a part that fell off a piece of equipment.

     

    Dillon returned to work for a short time until the pain became unbearable. Eventually, Dillon’s doctor decided that he had “reached maximum medical improvement” and gave him the go ahead to return to work, but only with permanent lifting restrictions.

     

    The problem was that Mountain Coal had a “no restrictions” or “100% healed” policy, barring any employee with medical restrictions from working in any capacity at the mine.

     

    Accordingly, the company fired Dillon after he had exhausted his short-term disability period.

     

    While Mountain Coal claimed that it fired Dillon for reasons other than the no-restriction policy, Dillon argued that the policy itself established that the company regarded him as being substantially limited in performing mining jobs.

     

    Unfortunately for Dillon, the trial judge and the 10th Circuit decided that the no-restrictions policy in and of itself did not establish this necessary element of his ADA claim.

     

    “The policy … only speaks to whether Mountain Coal regarded Mr. Dillon as substantially limited in his ability to work at West Elk Mine,” the 10th Circuit explained. “The policy does not reveal ‘the number and types of jobs utilizing similar training, knowledge, skill or abilities’ in the geographic area, as the EEOC regulations require. Mr. Dillon did not put on other evidence describing the jobs available in the area that fell into the class of ‘mining jobs,’ nor did he produce evidence demonstrating that mining jobs are, in fact, a class of jobs. He therefore produced no evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Mountain Coal regarded him as substantially limited in the ability to perform a class of jobs.” (Dillon v. Mountain Coal Co.)

     

    — Pat Murphy

    patrick.murphy@lawyersusaonline.com

     

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